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Frontier Justice: Legal Aid and UNHCR
Refugee Status Determination in Egypt
MICHAEL KAGAN
Refugee Rights Clinic, Buchmann Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University,
Ramat A viv, Tel A viv 69978, Israel
kaganm@post.ta u.ac.il
Where UNHCR conducts refugee status determination (RSD), its reactions to legal
aid for asylum-seekers have been mixed. Statistical evidence collected from Egypt
in 2002 indicates a correlation between receiving some form of legal aid service and
an asylum-seeker's increased chances of gaining refugee protection from UNHCR.
Unconventional forms of legal aid, including limited services by supervised nonlawyers (including volunteers from the refugee community) showed a positive
impact on first instance cases, while traditional legal aid models showed an impact
at the appeal stage. Legal aid should form an essential part of UNHCR's RSD
procedures, and NGOs should work to expand both traditional and innovative
forms of legal aid for asylum-seekers.
Keywords: refugee status determination, legal aid, UNHCR, Egypt
Introduction
In western countries, pro bono legal aid for asylum-seekers has been one of
the most important developments in systematic refugee rights advocacy since
the 1980s (Acer 2004). This article' revisits refugee legal aid in a widespread
but under-studied context: refugee status determination by the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
Refugee status determination (RSD) is the procedure by which refugees are
identified and distinguished from other migrants. RSD can be conducted on a
group or an individual basis, but individual procedures are much more resource
intensive and (because a person might be incorrectly rejected) riskier for refugees. Individual RSD is normally handled by a government, but in many places
it is conducted solely by UNHCR.
UNHCR's RSD work is currently the subject of review and debate. For several
years, studies in academic and human rights fora have criticized UNHCR's
procedures for lack of fairness safeguards. At the 2004 UNHCR Executive
Committee meeting, UNHCR's Director of International Protection said,
We are also undertaking a concerted analysis of the role of RSD in UNHCR's
global protection strategies, with a view to seeing where we should be
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strengthening our efforts, as well as where RSD might not be the correct response
(Feller 2004).

At the same time, a coalition of non-governmental organizations called for an
independent assessment of UNHCR's RSD activities (NGO Statement 2004).
In September 2005, UNHCR for the first time published a comprehensive set of
standards applicable to its own RSD procedures (UNHCR 2005).
This article seeks to add to this discussion by focusing on one particular
aspect of refugee status determination: the role of lawyers, legal aid, and the
right to counsel. In countries as diverse as Thailand, Kenya, Egypt, and Lebanon, NGOs have begun to develop legal aid programmes to help asylumseekers working their way through UNHCR RSD systems. The reaction from
UNHCR field offices to legal aid has varied from country to country. In Egypt,
UNHCR generally respected the right to counsel, but in Lebanon, at least until
2004, UNHCR resisted NGO attempts to advise or advocate on behalf of
individual asylum-seekers. In 2005, UNHCR stated clearly that its field offices
should allow asylum-seekers to have legal representation (UNHCR 2005:
section 4.3.3).
A survey by an NGO in Egypt that asked refugees and asylum-seekers to
rank their own needs for humanitarian services found that migrants rated
'UNHCR case preparation and advice' second in priority out of 15 potential
services, surpassed only by medical care (Briant and Kennedy 2004: 450-451).
Migrants who had been in Egypt for less than six months rated UNHCR case
preparation their first priority (ibid.).
This article begins by providing background on UNHCR refugee status
determination activities, and then describing the legal aid programmes that
existed in Egypt in 2001 and 2002. It then presents statistics drawn from a
sample of legal aid programmes in Egypt in 2002 demonstrating that provision
of legal assistance corresponds to an increase in asylum-seekers' chances of
receiving protection from UNHCR. This should not be seen as a surprising
finding; it is consistent with statistical studies of government-run RSD systems.
Following these statistics, the article outlines potential legal aid needs for
refugees and asylum-seekers and some of the obstacles a legal aid programme is
likely to face in countries where UNHCR conducts RSD. It then describes
some of the legal aid models suggested in academic literature and examines how
these models have been applied in Egypt. From this discussion, a means of
understanding how and why legal aid works in the UNHCR RSD context is
proposed.
Several limitations or cautions about this study should be noted from the
outset. First, the statistics presented here offer only a rough indication of the
role of legal aid. Legal aid programmes by their nature are set up to serve their
clients, not to conduct a clinical study. The hypothesis offered here is simply
that what is true of government RSD systems appears also to be true of
UNHCR: the right to counsel and the right to advice are essential to fair
and effective refugee status determination, and produce apparent results.
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Asylum-seekers applying to UNHCR are entirely reasonable to rank advice
and case preparation assistance as high priorities, and UNHCR and civil
society should seek to meet their demands.
A second limitation, or perhaps a strength, of this study is that the conclusions are to a significant extent based on personal experience. This paper is
largely the product of 18 months of work as a legal practitioner developing a
refugee legal aid programme in Egypt in 2001 and 2002. Since 2002, I have
either worked in, consulted with, or visited refugee legal aid programmes in
Israel, Lebanon, Thailand, Turkey, and Uganda. I will attempt in this article to
use my experience to make meaningful hypotheses based on the data that is
available. Nevertheless, legal advocacy will always remain to some extent more
art than science. Any attempt to analyse if, how and why legal aid works with
refugees will always be somewhat subjective. I proceed on the premise that a
somewhat subjective discussion of a critical issue is better than no discussion
at all.
UNHCR Refugee Status Determination: Background
In much of the geopolitical south, especially where refugees are housed in rural
camps, refugee status determination is often conducted on a primafacie basis.
In this method, all arrivals from a particular country are presumed to be
refugees without an in depth assessment of individual cases. In most northern
and western states, the process of applying for asylum involves individual RSD,
by which a government investigates an individual application. Such individual
RSD procedures typically involve an asylum-seeker submitting a written
explanation for his or her application, followed by an in depth interview,
research into country of origin conditions, and a decision about whether the
person meets the legal criteria for refugee status. There are often also mechanisms for administrative or judicial appeals.
Individual RSD also takes place in the south, especially in urban settings.
But in the south, UNHCR often has a far more extensive role, while governments are comparatively less involved in the RSD process. Because of
UNHCR's extensive role in RSD in the developing world, the agency is the
world's largest refugee status decision-maker. UNHCR conducted individual
refugee status determination in at least 48 countries in 2003, receiving at least
56,000 individual refugee status applications (UNHCR 2004). In 2004,
UNHCR reported that it conducted RSD in 80 countries, handling at least
75,000 applications per year, more than any single country. 2 All these sites of
UNHCR RSD were in the developing world. This prevalence of UNHCR RSD
in international law that status deterruns counter to the general preference
3
mination be conducted by states.
These numbers include states where UNHCR conducts RSD solely on its
own, in place of government procedures. This is the norm in most Arab
countries. There are also other types of RSD procedures, what might be called
mixed systems, which involve both government agencies and UNHCR, in which
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UNHCR has substantial influence in refugee status determination despite a
government's involvement, rather than just giving advice. Countries with such
mixed systems include Uganda and Israel.
When UNHCR handles all aspects of the RSD procedure, it is sometimes
called 'mandate status determination'. In theory, since the government is not
itself implementing the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(and its 1967 protocol), UNHCR is determining instead whether the applicants
are refugees according to its own mandate. But UNHCR often conducts RSD
in states that are parties to the Convention. In fact, in 2003 at least 26 of the
states where UNHCR conducted RSD were parties to the 1951 Convention.
In Egypt, which is one of these states, UNHCR determined refugee status by
virtue of an agreement with the Egyptian Government in which Egypt agreed to
provide refugees recognized by UNHCR with residence permits. Hence,
UNHCR's mandate status determination was also effectively a means by
which UNHCR could determine refugee status on behalf of the Egyptian
Government.
As noted in the introduction, UNHCR's RSD procedures are undergoing reassessment. In published literature on the subject, there have been roughly three
lines of criticism or concern about UNHCR RSD. First, there are concerns that
when UNHCR decides refugee cases it has a conflict of interest between its role
as refugee protector and refugee decision-maker (Human Rights Watch 2001).
Second, there are concerns that resource-intensive RSD programmes overextend UNHCR's resources (Kagan 2002, 2005). Third, and most relevant
for present purposes, UNHCR's RSD procedures lack many of the safeguards
that are normally expected in government-run procedures, and hence create a
risk of errant decisions that could leave bona fide refugees unprotected
(Alexander 1999; Kagan 2002, 2005; Human Rights Watch 2002; HarrellBond and Verdirame 2005). Among other things, UNHCR offices typically
have not provided failed applicants with specific explanations for their rejections, do not allow asylum-seekers access to most of the information considered
in their cases, and do not provide an appeal to an independent tribunal. In
2005, UNHCR issued standards stating that it is a 'best practice' for its field
offices to provide specific reasons for rejection, but did not change its policy
with regard to withholding evidence or providing an independent appeal
(UNHCR 2005).
In Egypt in 2002, asylum-seekers registered at the UNHCR office and were
scheduled for an interview at which they also submitted written statements of
their cases. They were interviewed by UNHCR staff, and then told to wait for
results. Results were posted after weeks or months, on public notice boards
next to anonymous case numbers. Rejected applicants were not given specific
reasons, only three-letter codes such as LOC (lack of credibility) or NWP
(no well-founded fear of persecution). Rejected asylum-seekers could appeal,
but appeals were considered only by a staff member different from the one
involved in the first decision; there was no separate appellate tribunal or
department. Appeals could be rejected on the basis of the written submission
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alone, or UNHCR could grant a new interview. After the rejection of an
appeal, UNHCR closed asylum-seekers' files (Kagan 2002).
UNHCR-Cairo permitted asylum-seekers to obtain legal assistance at all
stages of this procedure, so long as they submitted a written representation
agreement. Legal advisers would assist with preparing initial submissions,
accompanying applicants to interviews, and writing appeals. At interviews,
legal representatives could make opening and closing statements, and could
in limited cases ask for questions to be rephrased (ibid.).
Asylum-seekers (or their lawyers) were generally not allowed to see the
transcripts of their interviews at UNHCR, nor the assessments that UNHCR
staff completed about their applications, nor any other evidence UNHCR
collected and considered. In the course of the RSD process, UNHCR sometimes asked for medical or mental health assessments. The asylum-seekers were
not allowed to see the reports generated by these examinations (ibid.).
Legal Aid Programmes in Cairo
In 2000, 2001 and 2002 UNHCR's office in Egypt received more individual
RSD applications than any other UNHCR office in the world, according to the
agency's annual statistical overviews. In 2001, the number of applications in
Egypt (13,176) was almost twice the number in the next largest office, Kenya,
where 6,713 applications were lodged. Today, Egypt may have the largest and
most developed asylum-seeker legal aid initiatives of any country where
UNHCR is solely responsible for refugee status determination. Coinciding
with the large number of asylum-seekers in Egypt, three main legal aid initiatives were developed in Cairo between 2000 and 2002 to assist asylum-seekers
applying for protection at UNHCR.
The methods and nature of each legal aid programme as they operated in this
period will be described in the following sections. It should be noted that since
2002, both legal aid and refugee policy have evolved in Egypt. In particular, in
2003 the recognition rate at UNHCR climbed over 50 per cent after being below
30 per cent in 2002, most likely because UNHCR in Egypt began more consistently applying the broader Organization of African Unity refugee definition.
In 2004, as peace talks in Sudan progressed, UNHCR in Cairo began giving all
Sudanese applicants temporary protection, while suspending individual RSD
for most of them. This dramatically changed the nature of RSD in Egypt, since
Sudanese constituted the vast majority of refugee applicants at UNHCR's
Cairo office. Legal aid programmes also changed, including becoming more
selective of the kinds of cases they took on. There have also been substantial
organizational and institutional changes, which are not described here.
Egyptian Organizationfor Human Rights (EOHR) Refugee Legal AidProject
The Refugee Legal Aid Project housed at EOHR began officially in summer
2001. It was the largest and best funded of the legal aid programmes during the
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period studied. EOHR Refugee Legal Aid offered full service legal aid to
asylum-seekers, although most of the work was conducted by paralegal volunteers working with training and supervision by lawyers (including the author of
this study). Paralegals interviewed and advised clients, helped them collect
evidence and draft personal statements, researched country of origin information, prepared legal memoranda to accompany the evidence to UNHCR, and
attended UNHCR RSD interviews with clients. In addition to legal aid, EOHR
offered weekly classes teaching asylum-seekers about how to prepare their own
refugee claims.
Refugees Centrefor Human Rights (RCHR)
RCHR was at the end of 2002 the only wholly Egyptian legal aid centre for
refugees and asylum-seekers. It grew from a legal and social work centre that
began work with refugees in 2001, receiving training from lawyers at EOHR.
RCHR began by offering clients similar services as EOHR. But largely because
its lawyers were still receiving training in refugee law, RCHR stopped writing
legal memoranda for submission to UNHCR in many of its cases, and instead
concentrated on helping clients write coherent personal statements and accompanying them to UNHCR interviews where the client asked for such service.
Musa'adeen Project: All Saints Cathedral
The Musa'adeen project at All Saints Cathedral used non-lawyers to provide
limited assistance to asylum-seekers. Most of the non-lawyers were displaced
persons themselves working on a voluntary basis. Musa'adeen was a somewhat
informal project shared between four churches that sponsored programmes for
displaced people. Three of the churches had relatively little permanent organization or facilities for Musa'adeen, and provided little or no supervision for the
project, raising a number of concerns about the competence and effectiveness of
the service at those centres.
The data reported here about Musa'adeen work is based on the experience of
the Musa'adeen centre at Joint Relief Ministries, All Saints Cathedral, which
was the best organized of the Musa'adeen centres at the end of 2002. Because
the programme was based on the work of non-lawyers, the Musa'adeen-All
Saints focused their work solely on first instance cases, and offered clients only
two services: preparation of written testimonies, and interview preparation.
Musa'adeen volunteers were trained and supervised by the author of this
study (an American lawyer), and an Australian humanitarian worker who
had taken university and UNHCR courses in refugee law.
In addition to individual casework, the Musa'adeen-All Saints offered
weekly courses on interview preparation and 'writing your own testimony'.
In late 2002, Joint Relief Ministries, which operates a large health and
nutritional programme for newly arrived displaced people, began distributing
Musa'adeen leaflets and presented a video with advice about applying to
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Table 1
Musa'adeen-All Saints Non-lawyer Limited Assistance Model
Training

Training course
Observation
Probation/trial period
Regular re-training, on group and individual basis

Supervision

Emphasis on need for complete, coherent,
detailed case preparation
All case work supervised
Supervisor with expertise in law or RSD

Limited assistance

Core service: Case and interview preparation
Advice limited to encouragement to tell truth,
provide complete facts
No research
No legal memoranda
No representation at RSD interviews
No appeals (first instance cases only)
No durable solutions cases
Referrals made where needed (i.e. to full service legal
aid or medical/psychiatric care)

Organization

Centralized intake and client registration
Regular group meetings
Dedicated workspace and equipment

UNHCR to all new arrivals registering for humanitarian services. Table 1
illustrates the legal aid model developed at Musa'adeen-All Saints.
Impact of Legal Aid in Egypt: Statistical Data
StatisticalConfirmation of the Importance of Legal Aid
International law and UNHCR guidelines guarantee refugees and asylumseekers a right to counsel in a variety of contexts. In refugee status determination, UNHCR has stressed that asylum-seekers have a right to legal counsel
'at all stages of the procedure' (UNHCR 2001: para. 50 g). In its own RSD
procedures, UNHCR standards specify that asylum-seekers should be able
to bring legal representatives with them to their interviews (UNHCR 2005:
section 4.3.3). Refugees and asylum-seekers should also have the right to counsel in court proceedings on the same basis as nationals. 4 International law
guarantees equal access to courts and fair hearings to 'all persons', without
regard to nationality, in any criminal case or suit at law (see International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 14).
The wide endorsement of the right to counsel for asylum-seekers is based on
an implicit assumption that counsel is important to effective refugee status
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determination. One would therefore expect assisted asylum-seekers to succeed
in gaining refugee status recognition at a higher rate, all other factors being
equal. One recent study by Schoenholtz and Jacobs used success rates to assess
asylum legal aid in the United States and found that having a lawyer increased
people's chances of winning asylum in the US system (Schoenholtz and Jacobs
2002: 743-745). This finding confirmed the conclusion of a study of US asylum
adjudication more than 30 years earlier (Sofaer 1972: 1303). Schoenholtz and
Jacobs reported that asylum-seekers with legal representation were four to six
times more likely to be granted asylum than those without. They provide the
following additional details:
Representation matters even among nationalities that have an above-average
success rate for gaining pro se affirmative asylum.... For certain nationalities
with relatively average or low rates of success for the pro se affirmative applicant,
representation is particularly meaningful: 31% of those represented from India
won asylum as opposed to 1% who were not represented, and 60% of Liberian
asylum seekers were granted asylum when represented but only 8% when pro se
(Schoenholtz and Jacobs 2002: 743).
Schoenholtz and Jacobs' data also showed a positive effect of legal representation at different stages of the US asylum procedure, both in immigration court
and at the US asylum office (ibid.). Immigration court in the United States is a
complex and adversarial process. The asylum office is typically less adversarial,
with a neutral asylum officer interviewing an applicant in an office setting
(a process that has much in common with UNHCR RSD procedures). This
indicates that legal representation is important in both adversarial and nonadversarial asylum systems. Schoenholtz and Jacobs observe that while the
complexity of court makes legal counsel especially important, the need to
help asylum-seekers prepare to tell their stories clearly and coherently is equally
critical (ibid.).
These and other studies of administrative adjudication have indicated that
legal aid makes a statistically demonstrable impact on success rates in both
adversarial and non-adversarial settings (Getter 2001; Popkin 1977; McNeal
1999; Denckla 1999: 2597 fn. 106). In a similar manner, a general measure of the
impact of legal aid on UNHCR RSD can be had by comparing the recognition
rate of UNHCR applicants assisted by legal aid programmes against the overall
recognition rates at UNHCR. Yet, while Schoenholtz and Jacobs based their
study on government statistics, UNHCR does not systematically collect or
report data showing the effect of legal representation in its RSD procedures.
The 2001-2002 period in Egypt offers important data on the role of legal aid
in UNHCR RSD for several reasons.
First, the nature of RSD and legal aid in Egypt in 2001-2002 offered a
unique opportunity to use statistics as a rough gauge of the impact of the
right to counsel. Refugee legal aid programmes normally do not select clients as
a random sample; in fact many or most are highly selective. This means that
success rate statistics are difficult to analyse because the population that
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receives legal aid is pre-screened and not comparable to the overall population.
But Egypt in 2002 offered a unique opportunity to make an approximate
comparison in success rates. In Cairo in 2002, the legal aid programmes generally took clients and entered them in their records on a first come, first served
basis, with each organization taking new clients off waiting lists. There is still a
risk that legal aid clients were not representative (for instance, perhaps not all
asylum-seekers seek legal aid in equal numbers). However, the scenario of mass
RSD combined with first come, first served legal aid is probably the closest
approximation possible in a legal aid context of a representative sample allowing a meaningful statistical comparison of success rates. By 2004, legal aid
programmes in Egypt were systematically screening clients, and UNHCR was
no longer conducting individual RSD with the largest group of asylum-seekers
(Sudanese). These changes make it difficult, if not impossible, to meaningfully
compare legal aid success rates with overall success rates and identify any
significant correlations.
Second, in this period there were at least three different forms of legal aid
offered to asylum-seekers in Cairo. 5 This diversity allows an analysis of how
different types of services affect refugees in the RSD process, and can help offer
guidance to future legal aid initiatives.
I collected results from three main legal aid programmes for asylum-seekers
in Egypt for January through October 2002, including the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights Legal Aid Project (EOHR), the Musa'adeenAll Saints Cathedral, and the Refugee Centre for Human Rights (RCHR).
Statistics for EOHR and Musa'adeen were compiled using the same method
for both groups: client case numbers in the organizations' client databases were
compared to weekly UNHCR results bulletins. Results were divided by first
instance cases and appeals, because recognition rates are vastly different at
different levels of the procedure. The majority of cases in both programmes'
databases were not found on the bulletin, mainly because of long delays in
UNHCR decision-making. RCHR's results were reported to me by the organization itself, though I also checked a sample of RCHR's client case numbers
against UNHCR's public results notice sheets to ensure that the data kept by
the legal aid programme did not contain any noticeable reporting biases. The
samples tested were those where UNHCR announced RSD decisions from
January through October 2002.
The statistical comparisons presented here are those where the sample size
offers a measure of confidence in the results (power of 80 per cent and alpha
of .05), and the phenomena reported appeared consistent across comparable
national or ethnic groups. However, as stated in the introduction to this article,
the data here should be seen only as a rough measure of the effect of legal aid,
relevant mainly to confirm that what previous studies have found regarding
government-run RSD systems is also true with UNHCR. There are many
variables that contribute to success rates in RSD, and while the circumstances
in 2002 in Egypt allowed for a rough comparison, they cannot account for all of
the human variables that contributed to the results.
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Overall Impact of Legal Aid at UNHCR-Cairo
UNHCR-Cairo reported an overall recognition rate for the first half of 2002 of
24 per cent. Analysis of its results sheets found a first instance recognition rate
of 27 per cent (based on a sample of 3053 decisions) and an appeal success rate
of 4 per cent (based on a sample of 1107 decisions). Ideally, one would want to
compare the success rate of applicants with legal assistance to those without,
but since UNHCR does not report this data I compare assisted cases with
the overall rate. Since a small portion of the overall rate includes applicants
who had legal assistance, this data may slightly underestimate the impact of
legal aid.
As Table 2 illustrates, obtaining legal assistance correlated with an approximately doubled chance of an asylum-seeker winning refugee recognition at
UNHCR-Cairo. These statistics indicate that what is true for government-run
asylum systems is also true for RSD conducted by UNHCR: legal aid appears
to make a positive impact for asylum-seekers. This provides a strong argument
that legal aid is essential for people to have an effective right to seek asylum in
countries where UNHCR conducts RSD. UNHCR is correct to embrace the
right to counsel within its RSD procedures just as it encourages governments to
do within theirs.
Alternative Legal Aid Programmes: Comparative Indicators
Because the three programmes in Cairo offered different types of services,
comparing their success rates offers an opportunity to measure the relative
impact of various models of legal aid in the UNHCR RSD context. This means
of comparison can show the general effect of legal aid in what might be called a
'typical' refugee case, since statistics of this kind cannot account for all individual differences between cases and clients. The impact of legal aid may be
very different in particular cases, for instance in especially legally complex
cases, or cases involving especially vulnerable asylum-seekers such as unaccompanied minors or people with severe post-traumatic stress. Some caution about
comparing recognition rates is necessary because of the possibility that certain
programmes attract different types of clients. If a particular programme
attracts more challenging cases, its success rate is likely to be lower. At the first
instance level, the more limited forms of legal aid (Musa'adeen and RCHR)
Table 2
Correlation between Legal Aid and Recognition Rate at UNHCR-Cairo
Combined legal aid programmes
First Instance cases
Appeal cases
Total sample size

UNHCR overall

Assisted cases

Sample size

27%
4%

49%
18%

172
77
249
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Table 3
Comparative Success Rates in First Instance RSD Cases
First
Instance RSD

UNHCR
Overall

EOHR
Clients

Musa'adeen-All
Saints Clients

RCHR
Clients

Success rate
Sample size

27%
N = 3,053

19%
N = 58

64%
N = 72

64%
N = 42

Table 4
Success Rates in Appeal RSD Cases
Appeal RSD

UNHCR Overall

EOHR Clients

Success rate
Sample size

4.3%
N = 1,107

14.5%
N = 69

produced a higher statistical rate of success than full service legal aid offered by
EOHR. While applicants assisted by the Musa'adeen programme and RCHR
more than doubled their chances of refugee recognition, those assisted by
EOHR showed no significant improvement in success rate at first instance
(Table 3).
This comparative phenomenon holds true when the comparison is made
within a single nationality of asylum-seeker. For instance, among Sudanese
first instance asylum-seekers, the Musa'adeen-All Saints success rate was 67
per cent, while EOHR's was 29 per cent. UNHCR's 2002 PopulationStatistics
(Provisional) indicates that Sudanese asylum-seekers in Egypt had an overall
42 per cent success rate (4,245 recognized out of 10,142 decided cases).
However, EOHR's full service legal aid showed a substantially more positive
impact at the appeal stage. At appeal, clients assisted by EOHR were recognized at more than triple the overall UNHCR rate (Table 4). No data on
the effect of limited or non-lawyer assistance on appeal was available. The
Musa'adeen-All Saints avoided appeals cases in 2002 due to concerns that it
was not an adequately competent service in appeals, and RCHR also worked
mainly on first instance cases.
Understanding the Impact of Legal Aid at UNHCR
The refugee legal aid programmes in Egypt in 2002 are interesting in part
because each represented an entirely different approach.
The most traditional programme was EOHR, which aimed to offer full
service legal aid. Full service legal aid envisions a traditional lawyer-client
relationship in which a lawyer interviews and counsels a client, prepares
documents, represents the client in court or in negotiations as necessary,
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from the beginning to the resolution of a case. Full service legal aid offers the
advantage of a professional advocate concentrating on an individual's case to
provide comprehensive, zealous, and competent counsel. However, the advantage of this model is also its weakness. Since full service legal aid requires a high
level of competence and time, it is difficult to expand legal aid capacity to meet
the demand. Only approximately half of the asylum-seekers receiving legal aid
in Cairo were receiving full service legal aid, and most of these were receiving
assistance from paralegals, not fully qualified lawyers.
RCHR had a staff including lawyers, but offered a more limited service.
RCHR began by offering full service legal aid, but moved to a limited legal
assistance model in much of its work by focusing on helping clients write
testimonies and de-emphasizing legal memoranda and arguments. Responding
to the resource burdens imposed by full service representation, practitioners and
scholars have increasingly advocated offering more limited services to legal aid
clients. This 'unbundles' legal aid by breaking it down into component parts. In
the refugee context, it would mean limiting service to preparing a personal
affidavit, or helping an asylum-seeker prepare for a UNHCR interview.
The movement for limited legal services has been fuelled by demonstrations
in some contexts that it can make a substantial impact in increasing unrepresented peoples' chances of achieving their legal objectives. For instance, one
study found that tenants who had short counselling sessions with paralegals
fared better in landlord-tenant disputes than uninformed, unrepresented
tenants (Kim 1987: 1642 fn. 6).
The Musa'adeen similarly offered limited service, namely preparation of
first instance testimonies. The Musa'adeen also represented a further innovation because it relied on the work of non-lawyers, in this case refugees assisting
other refugees. Legal aid reformers have increasingly called for an increased
role for non-lawyers in advising and in some contexts representing clients
in order to increase the quantity of available advocates. There has been
acknowledgement 'that non-lawyer representatives appearing before agencies
achieved a success rate for their clients only marginally below the success rate
of parties represented by lawyers and radically better than unrepresented
parties appearing before the same agency' (Fordham Law Review 1999a:
1759-1760).
One of the central concerns with non-lawyer legal assistance is that it
deprives clients of the competent service they should be able to expect. Concerns about non-lawyer assistance are usually torn between two commitments
or realities. First, there is a commitment that low income people should not get
second-class legal services. Second, there is a realization that there simply are
not enough lawyers doing work with low income people for all of legal aid
needs to be met. Out of these concerns, the weight of academic commentary
now argues that non-lawyer services must be acknowledged and encouraged,
but that context-specific regulations should be developed to define the training
requirements, ethical boundaries, accountability and limits of non-lawyer practice (Fordham Law Review 1999a: 1763-1765).
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Another legal aid technique evident in Cairo in 2002 was attempts to provide
general legal information to groups rather than just individuals. In the case of
the Musa'adeen programme, this included classes where refugee volunteers
informed other refugees what to expect in their RSD interviews, and experiments with courses that taught asylum-seekers how to write their own testimonies for UNHCR. Such programmes can reach a large number of people
with relatively few resources. They would seem a natural initiative to inform
communities about their rights and legal procedures, and combat misinformation. However, unlike more individualized services, there is little evidence
available about exactly how effective they are at increasing a person's chances
of success in an asylum process.
With these categories of legal aid services in mind, we can better interpret
the success rates of the Egyptian programmes. The most surprising result
found in this study is that in first instance cases, full service legal aid did
not fare better in UNHCR RSD cases than more limited assistance, though it
showed strong impact in appeals cases. In theory, one would expect full service
legal aid to equal or exceed the success of more limited service. As noted
above, Musa'adeen and RCHR clients fared better at first instance than
EOHR clients. Because of the limits of the data in my study, I do not assert
that this data indicates that limited programmes like the Musa'adeen were
actually better than full service legal aid. It is possible that EOHR attracted a
more challenging set of clients and cases, a possibility that is very difficult to
verify statistically. The data here supports the expansion of limited and nonlawyer legal aid programmes for asylum-seekers, and with UNHCR RSD in
particular, but it should not necessarily be seen as undermining the case for full
service legal aid.
Despite these caveats, I would hypothesize that the procedural limitations of
the UNHCR RSD system stunt the effectiveness of the services that lawyers
normally offer their clients. Normally, having a lawyer means having an advocate trained to apply the law to the facts of a case, which in a refugee case should
reduce the chances that an asylum-seeker loses his or her application due to a
narrow or errant application of the refugee definition. However, a lawyer's
ability to do this will be severely constrained in a procedure that withholds
evidence, does not provide reasons for decision, and does not provide an
independent appeal. In this context, the main service a lcgal advocate can
provide may be to help a client simply establish the facts of his or her case
by helping to prepare a coherent personal statement and get ready for the RSD
interview (Care 2001).
At the same time, the success of full service legal aid in appeals is likely the
result of the greater need for legal analysis and argument at that level of
procedure. The appeals process is more like an adversarial adjudication because
a client is seeking to reverse a previous negative decision and needs to argue
that something went wrong initially. In the first instance stage, by comparison,
UNHCR has never evaluated the case before, and is deciding what initial
position to take on the case.
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In another system, a natural legal aid response to a flawed RSD procedure
would be impact litigation designed to challenge the propriety of UNHCR's
RSD procedure. This strategy would require a full service legal aid programme
that would strategically pick and develop 'test cases' to set positive judicial
precedents. When resources are scarce, impact litigation has obvious appeal
because community-wide policy change can compensate for an inability to
provide direct legal aid to all persons. However, impact litigation depends
on having a judicial system that follows the principle of stare decisis, making
a precedent set in one case enforceable in future cases. It also requires an
independent appeal structure in which to promote test cases. These structural
requirements make impact litigation, at least as traditionally conceived,
difficult to implement in UNHCR RSD systems. To start with, reasons for
decisions are not provided, much less published as binding precedents. It is
therefore difficult to conceive how a successful appeal would make any impact
beyond the individual client.
The suggestion that first instance legal aid should be limited in most cases
to testimony and interview preparation may be troubling for many advocates.
A refugee claimant should be able to submit all available arguments at all levels
of the RSD procedure. In many contexts, standard litigation strategy calls for
asserting all claims, defences, and arguments early if only to preserve potential
grounds of appeal. Failure to do so would often be considered legal malpractice. But if the success rates in Cairo are any indication, the most effective
advocacy with UNHCR's first instance refugee status determination is
minimalist.
All of this points to a 'less is more' strategy for refugee advocacy with
UNHCR RSD, at least at the first instance stage. This would mean limiting
assistance in most first instance cases to case preparation, while focusing full
service representation on appeals and particularly difficult first instance cases.
An exception might be made for especially vulnerable clients or legally complex
cases in which legal analysis and extra attention is likely to serve a greater
purpose at the first instance stage.

Legal Aid as a Safeguard against Error
As noted in this article, UNHCR's individual refugee status determination
procedures have been faulted for lack of procedural safeguards. UNHCR
has advised: 'The importance of [refugee status determination] procedures
cannot be overemphasized.... A wrong decision might cost the person's life
or liberty' (1989 ch. 2). It is for this reason that UNHCR has advocated
procedural safeguards such as an independent appeal, providing reasons for
rejection, and access to interpreters and legal counsel, among others (UNHCR
2001). If an RSD system operates without procedural safeguards, it increases
the risk of errant rejections, defined here as any refusal of protection to a
person who is in fact a refugee within the legal definition.
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RSD is rarely a simple exercise of applying a legal standard to a set of facts.
Complete evidence is rarely available. Finding the facts often requires applying
the 'benefit of the doubt' to the testimony of the applicant. Assessing the
credibility of this testimony is shaded by language and cultural barriers, variable levels of education, trauma, the interviewing techniques used, the quality
or lack of legal advice, and fear of authority. Moreover, refugee status is one of
the few areas of legal adjudication in which the decision-maker must make
an assessment of risks in the future rather than of events in the past or circumstances in the present. RSD often touches on areas of high political
sensitivity-immigration and political opposition to asylum, gender relations,
ethnicity, race, and religion, and the politics of foreign governments.
There are no known studies systematically quantifying the risks of wrong
decisions inherent in various types of RSD procedures, so the risk of errant
rejections remains to some extent conceptual. Different types of RSD error
risks can nevertheless be identified. RSD errors fall into two broad categories:
those resulting from decision-maker error, and those resulting from applicant
errors. Decision-maker errors are those in which all evidence that should come
to light has come to light, but the adjudicator nevertheless misinterprets the
evidence (for instance, incorrectly issuing a negative credibility assessment) or
misapplies the refugee definition (for instance, denying protection to someone
fearing persecution for reason of sexual orientation). Applicant errors are those
in which the applicant is unable or unwilling to coherently produce all available
facts and evidence in order to allow the decision-maker to make the correct
decision. This may occur because asylum-seekers misunderstand the process,
fear authority, or make costly decisions based on false advice. It may also
occur when trauma, language, educational, or other difficulties prevent an
asylum-seeker from coherently explaining all of his or her experiences.
Both types of error result in the same basic harm: a person in danger of
persecution is denied protection. One of the important aspects of a fair RSD
procedure is that it seeks to combat applicant errors as well as decision-maker
errors. Take as an example a woman genuinely in danger of domestic violence
or genital mutilation in her country of origin, who submits instead a false claim
of having been targeted for political activities out of shame or because members
of her community give her misleading advice about the RSD process.
A decision-maker would in a narrow sense be correct to reject her on credibility
grounds. Yet, had she had better advice, she might have submitted her
genuine reasons for fear and have obtained protection from the very same
decision-maker.
At a policy level, applicant errors are as much a failure of the system as
decision-maker errors in that they are often preventable by adequate procedural safeguards. This is why the most recent UNHCR advice on RSD procedures places significant emphasis on providing advice and information to
asylum-seekers early in the process, with special attention to vulnerable groups,
and requires the provision of competent interpreters (UNHCR 2001). Some
safeguards operate mainly to prevent decision-maker errors, such as providing
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reasons for rejection, access to evidence, and an independent appeal. Others,
such as the right to an interpreter, operate to prevent applicant errors.
The right to counsel can combat both applicant errors and decision-maker
errors. Legal advisers can prevent applicant errors by helping clients recount
their experiences coherently and in detail, and by encouraging honesty and
combating damaging rumours about the RSD process that spread through
refugee communities. Legal advocacy can prevent decision-maker errors by
providing research and analysis of the facts, and presenting legal theories
that support a client's case.
It is suggested here that in a non-adversarial RSD system such as UNHCR's,
legal aid at the first instance level should focus on preventing applicant errors.
In a non-adversarial refugee status determination process, the most important
voice-at least at first instance-must be the applicant's. A lawyer (or trained
non-lawyer) can provide essential assistance by helping the asylum-seeker to
tell their own story and make sure the facts are known to the decision-maker. If
the decision-maker rejects the asylum-seeker, then the focus should shift on
appeal to decision-maker errors. In this case, a lawyer's research, analytical and
persuasive skills will be at a premium.

Dealing with Scarce Resources
Vast Needs, Limited Capacity
Legal aid capacity often is dwarfed by the demand for the service. In Egypt, at
the end of 2002, legal aid in some form was available for about one in seven
asylum-seekers (estimated annual legal aid capacity of 1,350 cases, compared to
an estimated 10,000 refugee claims). This was an improvement on 2001, when
legal aid was available for about one in 15 asylum-seekers. Although legal aid
capacity in Egypt improved from about 900 persons in 2001 to about 1,350
persons in 2002, the improvement in percentage of the population served was
mainly the result of a drop in the number of refugee claimants arriving in Egypt.
UNHCR generally performs RSD where governments have not enacted their
own refugee legislation. This can translate to a lack of local lawyers, police,
prosecutors, government officials, and judges with knowledge of refugee or
migration law. This problem creates a range of protection challenges, and is a
hurdle to the expansion of legal aid capacity. In countries where UNHCR
performs RSD, legal aid needs are likely to be split between those requiring
assistance at UNHCR and those requiring access to domestic tribunals.
Although this paper concentrates on UNHCR RSD-related needs, the existence of other needs, and the split between UN and domestic authorities, must
factor into any legal aid strategy.
Refugees and asylum-seekers need access to domestic courts and authorities
much as citizens do, to resolve family or personal status problems, contractual
or employment disputes, and criminal matters, among others. Domestic courts
can also be engaged to prevent a migrant's detention or deportation (Table 5).
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Table 5
Potential Refugee and Asylum-seeker Legal Aid Needs
UNHCR-related legal aid needs

Domestic authority-related legal aid needs

Refugee status determination
Resettlement/durable solutions
Material assistance decisions
(health, education, housing,
nutritional, monetary, etc.)

Defences to deportation
Family law/personal status cases
Employment cases
Contractual and tort cases
Criminal cases
Other routine legal matters

The relative scarcity of legal aid causes administrative, strategic and ethical
dilemmas for legal aid programmes. In 2001, when the number of asylumseekers in Egypt was higher and legal aid capacity was lower, legal aid programmes struggled to set up workable systems for managing intake, a task that
typically involved turning away large numbers of desperate people. More fundamentally, each legal aid programme has to decide how to allocate its scarce
resources, which raises strategic questions about how legal aid services are best
targeted to make the most impact, and ethical questions about whether it is
appropriate for a legal aid programme to choose between potential clients on
anything but a first-come, first-served basis.
Legal aid for refugees requires a wide array of skills that are difficult to find
in one person. In Egypt, most lawyers speak only Arabic, while most texts
and training materials on international refugee law are available only in English
or other European languages. UNHCR's Cairo office functions primarily in
English; although most staff are Egyptian and speak Arabic, supervisors are
generally international staff and work in English. While legal aid at UNHCR
may require English and a knowledge of international law, providing legal aid
in front of Egyptian courts requires Arabic and a licence to practice law in
Egypt.
ClientlMatterSelection
The reality that low cost legal aid is not available to all who need it has led legal
aid programmes to search for criteria by which to prioritize cases and clients in
order to focus legal services where they will do the most good. This has been
controversial with some commentators because it requires a legal aid programme to decide which type of clients or which type of cases are most important, typically based on some external agenda or value judgment. More recently,
legal aid scholars and practitioners have embraced the need for client/matter
selection (Tremblay 1999). A first come, first served system favours people with
the time, knowledge, foresight and persistence to come early and often and can
amount to a 'survival of the fittest technique []to select clients' (Fordham Law
Review 1999b: 1836).
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Client/matter selection was endorsed by the 1998 Fordham University Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income Persons (Fordham
Law Review 1999a: 1780). The Fordham Recommendations propose seven
criteria by which to prioritize clients and issues:
- Importance of the interests at stake;
-Degree to which the legal aid resources will make a different in the outcome;
-Whether the case offers long or short term benefits;
-Whether there are potential collective benefits to the community;
-Amount of resources that would be required to take the case;
- Availability of alternative resources (i.e. cases that can get assistance elsewhere
could be a lower priority);
- Degree of emergency;
- Referrals for community-based organizations.
The Fordham Conference also developed a list of factors that legal aid
programmes should not consider in client/matter selection:
-Personal judgment about the client's moral worth as an individual;
-Client skill at surmounting arbitrary access rules in the intake process;
- Unpopularity of the case, client, or cause;
-Restrictions on clients or cases imposed as a condition to receive funding.
Before deciding how to apply such principles in the context of refugee legal aid
at UNHCR, legal aid needs a clear definition of the purpose. Should legal aid
seek to help as many people as possible get refugee protection? Though a
tempting goal for any legal aid programme, the utilitarianism implied by
this objective is potentially undermining to human rights. It slides legal aid
away from asserting rights and toward advocating for a benefit to an interest
group (i.e., more UNHCR recognition for more asylum-seekers). A utilitarian
perspective could have disturbing concrete effects in the way scarce legal aid
resources are delivered. The statistics from Cairo illustrate that only a small
minority of appeals are successful at UNHCR-Cairo, even with legal aid. But
it is an area where legal aid still made a significant impact in increasing the
chances of success. In a scenario where only one in seven asylum-seekers can get
legal aid, should a legal aid programme take a difficult, time-consuming case
that has a low chance of success?
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (article 14) says that people do
not only have a right to enjoy asylum; people have the right to seek asylum.
I would argue that legal aid is ultimately more about seeking asylum than about
enjoying it. Legal aid ensures that asylum-seekers can present their cases as
effectively as possible, which facilitates more effective refugee status determination, and hence more effective refugee protection. In this formulation, it is
not important how many people will ultimately win their cases, but it is
important (as the Fordham Recommendation set out) whether legal aid

Legal Aid and Refugee Status Determination in Egypt

63

will make a difference in the outcome (and hence in enhancing a person's
effective right to seek asylum). Hence, providing legal aid in an appeal
might be just as important as in a first instance case, even if the overall chance
of success is low.
Full service legal aid by qualified lawyers is the most scarce resource in
legal aid programmes. It is most important in appeals, petitions to re-open
closed files, legally complex first instance cases, and first instance cases with
especially vulnerable clients (traumatized people, unaccompanied minors, mentally impaired asylum-seekers, etc.). In these cases, complete attention by a
qualified professional is most necessary for asylum-seekers to have an effective
opportunity to present a refugee claim. Cases involving potential exclusion
from refugee status, cessation of refugee status, or cancellation of refugee
protection due to fraud also call for full service legal aid because they involve
unique procedural safeguards and (where accusations of crime or fraud are
involved) can take on an adversarial character requiring a vigorous legal
defence.
In the end, a legal aid programme should aim to have more first instance
clients who receive limited services than clients who receive full service, both
because they require fewer legal aid resources, and because cutting down on
first instance errors reduces the need for legal aid on appeal. Because full
service legal aid is such a scarce resource, it is particularly important that
such programmes establish strong referral partnerships with other legal aid
programmes, humanitarian NGOs, and UNHCR. This will help ensure that the
people most in need of the service can be identified.

Professional Qualifications and Ethics
Ensuring basic standards of ethics and competence is essential for providing
effective, responsible and sustainable legal aid for refugees. These matters must
be addressed either through internal regulation by legal aid programmes themselves, or by UNHCR establishing standards and regulatory mechanisms
through transparent consultations with legal aid providers, and studies of
other forms of administrative adjudication.
A first step would be to set minimum training qualifications to perform
different services, and create a register of people permitted to provide legal
assistance or counsel to asylum-seekers. A second step would be to draft a code
or guidelines governing ethics and competency standards. This could be based
on the codes already in place regulating refugee advocates in many asylum
states. It should cover issues such as confidentiality, lawyer-client privilege and
work product, and diligence. A third step is to design a complaints mechanism
to establish accountability to the established standards. Clients of legal aid
programmes should be able to make complaints if they believe they have
received incompetent or unethical service. NGOs and JNHCR should establish mechanisms to resolve such problems.
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Since UNHCR is an international institution operating outside the normal
domestic legal framework, should legal aid practitioners at UNHCR be
licensed to practise law in the country?
If a law licence is required, it need not necessarily be a local law licence. In
Egypt, Thailand and elsewhere, legal aid for refugees was initiated by foreign
activists or lawyers who aimed to eventually turn the programmes over to local
lawyers. As an international adjudicator and UN agency, UNHCR is for these
purposes akin to the International Court of Justice or International Criminal
Court. These bodies require lawyers to be admitted to practise in any state, not
necessarily in the state where the tribunals operate. Though UNHCR is not a
court per se, in the RSD context it functions under a similar international
banner as a system of administrative adjudication. Since UNHCR offices
themselves typically have a mixture of local and international staff, it would
be inappropriate for UNHCR to prohibit international lawyers to practise
before it. To the degree lawyers are required in UNHCR RSD, any lawyer
admitted to practise in any state should be able to practise in front of UNHCR.
In September 2005, UNHCR issued standards specifying that a legal representative in its RSD procedures need not be a licensed attorney but should
have a 'working knowledge of refugee law' (UNHCR 2005: section 4.3.3).
There are a number of reasons to support the position that legal aid at
UNHCR RSD should not always require a law licence, although there is a
need to regulate professional qualifications through other means. RSD systems
in a significant number of major asylum states have long allowed non-lawyers
to act as advocates for asylum-seekers. UNHCR offices typically have nonlawyers acting as interviewers and decision-makers in RSD, and use a generally
informal adjudication process. As the statistics reported here from Musa'adeen
show, non-lawyers (including refugees themselves) can make a substantial
positive impact by providing limited assistance in RSD. For these reasons,
requiring legal aid personnel to be lawyers would be unnecessarily restrictive.
Nevertheless, there is a need to develop a means of guaranteeing minimum
standards of ethics and competency in legal aid in the UNHCR RSD
context. The fact that UNHCR acts as an adjudicator in dozens of countries,
deciding tens of thousands of cases around the world, is good reason for the
development of applicable codes of professional conduct at the local or global
levels.
Any definition of competence in UNHCR RSD should be tied to the service
provided. Non-lawyers or less qualified people may be competent to provide
testimony preparation services under supervision, but not to write legal memoranda, prepare appeals, or represent clients in RSD interviews. Organizations
might set up two tiers of registered advocates. The first tier could be refugee
caseworkers, who would prepare testimonies and conduct interview preparation under supervision but be prohibited from engaging in more extensive
individual counselling or representation. The second tier could be refugee
advocates and could include lawyers or people with a high degree of training
and experience in refugee status determination. Refugee advocates would be
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allowed to draft legal memoranda, provide more specific legal advice, and
represent applicants in RSD interviews.
Conclusion
The available data from refugee legal aid programmes in Egypt in 2002 support
the hypothesis that providing advice and assistance to asylum-seekers increases
their chances of success in obtaining refugee recognition through a UNHCRoperated refugee status determination procedure. This result is unsurprising in
light of past studies of government-run RSD procedures, and studies of other
forms of administrative adjudication.
The available data also provide support for the use of unconventional forms
of legal aid to asylum-seekers, at least at a first instance level in a nonadversarial procedure. At this stage of RSD in Egypt, assistance limited to
advice and preparation of testimonies correlated with a significant increase in
clients' chances of success. Such limited assistance by trained and supervised
non-lawyers showed a similar success rate. Full service legal aid, involving
preparation of legal arguments and research as well as client testimonies,
did not show such an impact. However, on appeal, full service legal aid did
correlate with a significant increase in success rate.
I argue that legal aid is essential as a safeguard against RSD error at
UNHCR. UNHCR is correct to embrace the right to counsel for asylumseekers and should encourage the development of legal aid wherever it conducts
status determination. UNHCR should inform all applicants of their right to
counsel, and refer them to reputable legal aid organizations. Such referrals are
especially important for the most vulnerable asylum-seekers, such as single
women, traumatized people, and people lacking formal education.
In first instance cases, the non-adversarial nature of UNHCR's RSD process
combined with the shortage of legal aid resources should give legal aid providers reason to focus on preventing errors by the applicants themselves. The
focus here should be on developing a coherent and detailed testimony, and
collecting evidence to which the asylum-seeker has direct access. These services
can be provided, with training and supervision, by non-lawyers and should be
aimed at making sure that the decision-maker has a complete and truthful
understanding of the facts of the case.
At the appeal level, the full impact of legal aid may be reduced by the limits
of UNHCR's RSD procedures. The fact that UNHCR does not let applicants
see the evidence considered in their cases, and does not provide full reasons for
rejection, limits the contribution that lawyers' analytical skills could make in
ensuring a reliable adjudication process. Such procedural gaps eliminate essential safeguards against decision-maker errors. Even with these limits, legal aid is
an important safeguard against factual or legal errors by decision-makers,
especially in appeals.
No matter the form of legal aid, attention must be paid to ethics and professional qualifications. Legal aid organizations and UNHCR should work
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together to develop standards defining who is qualified to carry out particular
legal aid tasks, and to develop some form of regulation to prevent abuses and
exploitation of asylum-seekers.
The right to counsel is only one part of a wider discussion of UNHCR's
refugee status determination work. However, legal assistance to asylum-seekers
should be an expanded part of UNHCR RSD in the future.
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